INTERPOL Red Notices and the Prohibition of Double Jeopardy – quo vadis?

The article „INTERPOL Red Notices and the Prohibition on Double Jeopardy- quo vadis?“ was published bilingually, both in German and in a stand-alone – and therefore slightly divergent – English-language version. You are reading the English-language version here.

Also a comment on European Court of Justice’s judgement of May 12, 2021

I. Introduction

In its ruling of May 12, 2021, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) took a position for the first time regarding the applicability on the prohibition of double jeopardy (ne bis in idem) in extradition proceedings with non-member states due to an INTERPOL Red Notice. Previously, on May 19, 2020, in extradition proceedings based on a request from the United States of America (USA), the Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main had already ruled that Art. 54 of the Schengen Convention applies in bilateral extradition proceedings with third countries if the person concerned has already been sanctioned under criminal law for the same act in a Contracting State to the Schengen Agreement and the home state of the person concerned raises the principle of ne bis in idem.[1]

According to the ECJ, the prohibition of double jeopardy in EU and Schengen Law precludes the arrest of a person based on a Red Notice if the applicability of the prohibition of double jeopardy has been established by a final court decision in a Contracting or Member State regarding the same acts as those on which the Red Notice is based. In this respect, the ECJ requires the Member States of the European Union to establish legal remedies to obtain a court decision on the applicability of ne bis in idem at the national level.

Even though further legal protection through legal remedies are helpful, the follow-up question is whether legal remedies provide legal certainty for persons affected by a Red Notice. The ECJ ultimately only ruled on the “textbook case”, which was the basis of the request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Court of Wiesbaden: the person concerned was aware of an INTERPOL Red Notice, while being in the European home country. Therefore, legal remedies should be available under national law to determine the applicability of ne bis in idem by a court.

However, in many cases of a Red Notice, persons concerned are not aware that an international arrest request has been issued against them. According to the ECJ, ne bis in idem does not preclude an arrest in Contracting and Member States in order to obtain the relevant information from the competent authorities of the Contracting or Member State to verify the applicability of ne bis in idem.

The purpose of this article is to discuss the ECJ’s decision of May 12, 2021, and to examine individual scenarios to highlight the continuous legal uncertainty for the persons concerned.

II. The ECJ’s Judgement of May 12, 2021

The decision of May 12, 2021, by the ECJ followed the six questions of the Administrative Court of Wiesbaden for a preliminary ruling under Art. 267 TFEU.[2] In the proceedings of the Administrative Court of Wiesbaden, the person affected by an INTERPOL Red Notice brought a legal action against Germany, represented by the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA), seeking all appropriate measures to delete the INTERPOL Red Notice, which was based on a U. S. Arrest Warrant. The investigations by the Munich Public Prosecutor’s Office I into the person concerned because of the same offence were already terminated pursuant to Section 153a (1) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure (StPO).

The Administrative Court of Wiesbaden turned to the ECJ with the main question[3] of whether Art. 54 of the Schengen Convention and Art. 21 (1) TFEU, each in connection with Art. 50 CFR, preclude provisional arrest in a Contracting or Member State on the basis of an INTERPOL Red Notice if the person in question has already been subject of a criminal prosecution in a Contracting or Member State for the same act and these proceedings were terminated by the Public Prosecutor’s Office [67].[4]

1. Regarding the admissibility of the questions raised by the Administrative Court of Wiesbaden, some Member States objected to the ECJ that the questions referred were of hypothetical nature because the person concerned did not leave the country [44]. The ECJ did not accept this argument, which obviously had the sole purpose of limiting the legal protection of the plaintiff at the Administrative Court of Wiesbaden. According to the ECJ, the plaintiff initiated proceedings at the Administrative Court of Wiesbaden in order to create the necessary conditions for him to be able to leave the country without risking an arrest in a Contracting or Member State on the basis of a Red Notice [54].

Another objection was that the questions from the Administrative Court of Wiesbaden had become irrelevant because the relevant Red Notice had already been deleted on September 5, 2019 [48]. The request for a preliminary ruling from the Administrative Court of Wiesbaden was made on June 27, 2019. In the proceedings at the Administrative Court of Wiesbaden the plaintiff applied – after the deletion of the Red Notice – for a declaratory judgement (Feststellungsklage) which states that from now on, Germany has an obligation to take all measures necessary, firstly, in order to avoid any new Red Notices in respect of the same acts being published by INTERPOL and secondly, to erase any new Red Notice in the event that it should be published by INTERPOL [59]. Accordingly, the dispute in the main proceedings had not been resolved and the answers to the questions referred remained necessary for the resolution of the dispute [60].

The ECJ only found that question 5 was inadmissible. The question was whether the level of protection of personal data at INTERPOL was sufficient to allow the authorities subject to Directive 2016/680 to transfer data to INTERPOL. The Administrative Court of Wiesbaden had not sufficiently explained the relevance for the decision of the dispute in the main proceedings [64 et seq.].

Regarding questions 1, 2 and 3, the ECJ essentially dealt with the termination of the German criminal proceedings by the prosecution pursuant to Section 153a (1) of the German Code of Criminal Procedure, the related scope of Art. 54 of the Schengen Convention, Art. 21 TFEU and Art. 50 CFR, as well as the necessity of judicial protection for the person affected.

a) The ECJ already stated before that ne bis in idem also applies to procedures according to Section 153a of the German Code of Criminal Procedure. In those proceedings the public prosecutor of a Member State terminates the case, without the involvement of a court and without an indictment, once the accused person has fulfilled certain obligations[5] [73 et seq.].

b) Subsequently, the ECJ discussed whether a provisional arrest on the basis of a Red Notice constitutes “persecution” in the meaning of Art. 54 of the Schengen Convention. As a result, the ECJ – in agreement with the opinion of Advocate General Bobek[6]– confirmed that the provisional arrest by Contracting and Member States on the basis of a Red Notice is considered “persecution” because the protective purpose of Art. 54 of the Schengen Convention is affected.

The purpose of Art. 54 of the Schengen Convention and Art. 50 CFR is that no one may be prosecuted and punished again in criminal proceedings for an offense for which they have already been convicted or acquitted in another Contracting Party. Art. 54 of the Schengen Convention implies that there is mutual trust between the Contracting States in their respective criminal justice systems and that each of them accepts the application of the criminal law in force in the other Contracting States, even when the outcome would be different if its own national law were to apply. However, States were required to exercise this treaty discipline only if it was established that the person had already been finally convicted of the same offence by another Contracting or Member State. This also requires the possibility of requesting relevant information from Contracting States – according to Art. 57 of the Schengen Convention – in order to examine whether the prohibition of double jeopardy actually applies [80 et seq.].

The provisional arrest of a person on the basis of a Red Notice could, if the application of the prohibition of double jeopardy was questionable, represent an “essential step” in order to carry out the necessary checks while avoiding the risk that the person concerned may abscond and thus avoid potential prosecution [84 et seq.].[7]

However, as soon as the authorities of a Contracting or Member State become aware that a final judicial decision has been made in another Contracting or Member State, thereby establishing that the ne bis in idem principle applies with regard to the acts covered by that Red Notice, the mutual trust of the Contracting States as well as the right to freedom of movement precludes provisional arrest [89].

This is followed by the most significant finding of the ECJ in its decision: In order to ensure the effectiveness of ne bis in idem, Member and Contracting States must ensure the availability of legal remedies enabling the persons concerned to obtain a final judicial decision establishing that the ne bis in idem principle applies [92].

In addition, the ECJ pointed out that the extradition treaty between the European Union and the U.S. of June 25, 2003, does not expressly provide that the Member States may refuse extradition on the grounds of ne bis in idem.

However, Art. 54 of the Schengen Convention applies because the provisional arrest due to a Red Notice results in law enforcement action in the territory of the Contracting States, which has the same adverse effect on that person’s right to freedom of movement like criminal proceedings conducted entirely within that Contracting State [94].[8]

c) Subsequently, the ECJ discusses whether the application of Art. 54 of the Schengen Convention to INTERPOL Red Notices could be a “conflict with international law“[98].[9] Accordingly, such a violation could exist if the Contracting and Member States do not arrest a person against whom a Red Notice has been issued.

It is remarkable that the ECJ refers to the Rules on the Processing of Data (RPD) with respect to INTERPOL’s legal status,[10] which has been disputed under Public International Law [99]. The ECJ raises the question of whether Member States of INTERPOL violate the regulations of INTERPOL if they do not arrest a person subject to a Red Notice on the basis of Art. 54 of the Schengen Convention.

According to Art. 87 RPD, the Member States of INTERPOL are obliged to arrest the wanted person provisionally only if such a measure is “permitted under national law and applicable international treaties”. According to the ECJ, States do not violate their obligations as a member of INTERPOL if a person is not arrested due to the violation of European and Schengen Law [99].

However, it becomes highly doubtful that the ECJ – without further justification – would grant the regulations of INTERPOL relevance under Public International Law in the meaning of international and state treaties.

d) According to the above findings, the ECJ noted that the request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Court of Wiesbaden did not establish that the relevant Red Notice concerned the same acts within the meaning of ne bis in idem [101].

Consequently, the provisional arrest of the person concerned in a Contracting or Member State at this stage would neither violate Art. 54 of the Schengen Convention nor Art. 21 (1) TFEU, read in the light of Art. 50 [102]. According to the ECJ, this interpretation is also consistent with the rules on the European arrest warrant, with Directive 2014/41/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 3, 2014 regarding the European Investigation Order in criminal matters [104 et seq.].

3. In the last section the ECJ examined questions 4 and 6, which concerned the legal consequences under Data Protection Law. The Administrative Court of Wiesbaden asked whether the provisions of Directive 2016/680 with respect to Art. 54 of the Schengen Convention and Art. 50 CFR should be interpreted as precluding the processing of personal data by the authorities of the Member States if ne bis in idem applies in the case of a Red Notice.

a) The ECJ recognized that under Art. 8 of Directive 2016/680 the processing of personal data is only lawful if and to the extent that processing is necessary for the performance of a task carried out by a competent authority for the purposes set out in Art. 1 (1), and that it is based on Union Law or national law of the Member States. This is provided by an efficient exchange of personal data for law enforcement and prevention purposes through cooperation between the European Union and INTERPOL according to recital 25 of Directive 2016/680 [113].

While examining questions 4 and 6, the ECJ followed its previous line of reasoning, according to which it must be possible for Member States to reliably verify the conditions for the application of ne bis in idem. In order to fulfil their own tasks in terms of effective criminal prosecution and for prevention purposes, it must be possible for Member States to include the Red Notice in the national search database in order to check whether the prohibition of double jeopardy actually applies.

However, if there is a judicial decision of a Contracting or Member State that has determined the application of ne bis in idem on the basis of the same acts, the recording of the data contained in the Red Notice is no longer necessary, so that the subject of the data must be able to request that “the controller erase personal data relating to him or her without undue delay” pursuant to Art. 16 (2) of Directive 2016/680 [120]. The controller within the meaning of Directive 2016/680 is, according to Art. 3 no. 8 with respect no. 7, the competent public authority. However, this right or claim for deletion of personal data does not apply to INTERPOL because it’s not considered a public authority.

b) In this context, it should be noted that according to Advocate General Bobek’s “it cannot be excluded that the United States may in the future ask Interpol to re-issue a red notice for the same acts”.[11]

This clear statement by an Advocate General at the ECJ already illustrates INTERPOL’s debatable handling of Red Notices.

However, according to Bobek the processing of the personal data contained in the Red Notice is necessary in individual cases because it is in the interest of the person who is subject to the Red Notice: “Were it to be otherwise, and all the data had to be erased immediately once ne bis in idem was triggered, the consequences could be rather odd: the legally imposed memory span of the national police authorities would become like that of Dory the fish (still Finding Nemo) so that the requested person would end up being forced, in a rather unfortunate re-run of Bill Murray’s Groundhog Day, to invoke and prove the protection under the principle ne bis in idem, with regard to the criminal charges in question, over and over again.”[12]

The ECJ considered this aspect in its decision – without addressing Bobek’s movie associations – and stated that the data remaining on the record must be accompanied by a note, an addendum,[13] that the person in question may no longer be prosecuted in a Member or Contracting State for the same acts for reason of the ne bis in idem principle [120].

III. Evaluation

In the decision of May 12, 2021, the ECJ confirmed that the arrest of a person on the basis of an INTERPOL Red Notice is not precluded by EU and Schengen Law, if ne bis in idem was not established by a national judicial decision. Subsequently, the authorities in the State where the person is arrested can still request and examine information on the applicability of ne bis in idem within the usual extradition proceedings.

The fact that the ECJ requires the Contracting and Member states to create a legal remedy for obtaining a court decision in order to establish the applicability of ne bis in idem and to create legal certainty for the person being prosecuted is of decisive significance and practical relevance.

So far so good.

In the following, two scenarios of practical relevance will be considered in which the person concerned has knowledge, and does not have knowledge, of a Red Notice in order to demonstrate the remaining legal uncertainties.

1. Based on the request for a preliminary ruling by the Administrative Court of Wiesbaden, the ECJ only covers the following “textbook case”, where the person concerned is aware of a Red Notice: the criminal proceedings against the person concerned had been finally closed in a Contracting and Member State due to a termination of the case, an acquittal or a verdict. The person concerned became aware that an INTERPOL Red Notice had been issued against him on the basis of a U.S. arrest warrant. As a result of the ECJ’s decision, the person concerned can now obtain a court decision, presumably through the Administrative Court of Wiesbaden, which will examine and confirm the application of ne bis in idem.

a) If the person concerned has then obtained a court decision that established ne bis in idem, the recording of personal data in the Member States is precluded, according to the ECJ. However, if the data remains recorded, the Red Notice should be accompanied by an addendum stating that the person concerned may no longer be prosecuted in the Member or Contracting States due to ne bis in idem.

b) In this “textbook case” decided by the ECJ, the possibility must be considered that if a final judicial decision on the applicability of ne bis in idem already exists in Germany, and if the person concerned travels to another Contracting or Member state, a court in this Contracting or Member State may have a different opinion on the identity of the crime and the applicability of ne bis in idem. The ECJ itself stated that the mutual trust of the Contracting and Member States also requires that the information necessary must be verified [80 et seq.]. Therefore, the possibility remains that Contracting and Member States will also review the judicial decision of another State to determine the application of ne bis in idem, while the person concerned is arrested.

c) Unfortunately, the ECJ did not comment further – due to lack of jurisdiction and relevance to the decision – on how the person can object to the Red Notice in Contracting and Member States. However, the ECJ did state that subject to the data has a right to request the deletion of personal data according to Art. 16 (2) of Directive 2016/680.

A judicial decision establishing the applicability of ne bis in idem per se does not provide freedom of travel to the persons concerned, since INTERPOL and the Member and Contracting States must first become aware of such a judicial decision.

In this regard, it should be noted that data for law enforcement is exchanged via different “channels” within the framework of international cooperations.[14]

The Contracting States to the Schengen Agreement use the second-generation of the Schengen Information System (SIS II) for search requests. However, only law enforcement requests from other Contracting States and not from third countries are implemented in SIS II. An exception is passport data, which is exchanged with INTERPOL according to recital 18 as well as Art. 55 of Council Decision 2007/533/JHA of June 12, 2007. In Germany, the complaint against a notice in SIS II should be addressed to the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information or to “SIRENE”, which is responsible for the national and international exchange of data via SIS II and is located at the BKA. It seems obvious to request Contracting and Member States to delete the arrest request in the relevant SIS II “channel”. However, it also seems possible that the Red Notice remains in INTERPOL’s “channel”.

INTERPOL uses the electronic communication system “I-24/7”.[15] A request for deletion of data must be addressed to the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF), because of a violation of INTERPOL’s regulations.[16] INTERPOL’s ties and obligations under international law remain disputed.[17] Therefore, it seems possible that INTERPOL could deny any obligation under the ECJ’s jurisdiction and could argue that the responsibility for implementation and enforcement lies with the National INTERPOL Offices of the Contracting and Member States.[18]

A request to delete relevant data to prevent the execution of a Red Notice can lead to several bureaucratic challenges. In any case, the Contracting and Member states have the responsibility of guaranteeing the prohibition of double jeopardy and also of deleting personal data or adding an addendum. Consequently, the addressee of a request for deletion remains the respective Member State that stores personal data within the meaning of Directive 2016/680. However, it is decisive that this addendum is implemented in all “channels” serving the international exchange of information for law enforcement to prevent an arrest.

2. Besides the discussed “textbook case”, in other cases it is not obvious to the person concerned that a law enforcement agency in a third country is also executing investigations against the relevant person. The reason for this unpredictability is usually a very broad understanding of national jurisdiction in some nations.[19] Advocate General Bobek also pointed out that “in the case of some crimes, it is also not unthinkable that a red notice for the same acts may be issued at the request of several States.”[20]

The person concerned therefore often leaves a Member State without knowing the risk of arrest and is arrested in another Member State, for example Germany.

a) In such a case, the usual extradition procedure under German Law follows, where the relevant Prosecution Offices obtain relevant information in order to examine the applicability of ne bis in idem.

During the extradition proceedings the extradition documents from the country that issued the Red Notice are requested. The extradition treaty between Germany and the U.S. of June 20, 1978, for example, provides for a period of 40 days for transmitting the formal extradition request, which can be extended to another 20 days. In addition, the final judicial decision from the Contracting or Member State that relates to the same facts must also be transmitted from the Contracting or Member State to the German authorities that are in charge for the extradition proceedings.

The defence of the person concerned can also submit the final judicial decision of the Contracting or Member State to the Prosecution Office in Germany. However, the Prosecution Office in charge will also request the documents through diplomatic channels with a significant amount of time.

The ECJ’s decision of May 12, 2021 confirmed that the person concerned remains under arrest while all relevant information regarding the applicability of ne bis in idem is examined in the usual extradition proceedings.

The enforcement of the warrant for extradition is usually not suspended due to an alleged flight risk claimed by the General Prosecution Offices and the Higher Regional Courts.

b) The question remains of how the person concerned can obtain better legal certainty if the criminal proceedings against them have been concluded in a Contracting or Member State and – without their knowledge – a law enforcement agency abroad establishes jurisdiction and issues a Red Notice.

An ambitious proposal for a solution would be to require INTERPOL to carry out more extensive checks when implementing a Red Notice in its own information system where cases are obviously cross-border. According to Art. 6 RPD, INTERPOL’s National Central Bureaus are also authorized to enter and delete data in the INTERPOL information system. According to Art. 3 (1) (a) of INTERPOLS Constitution,[21] the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files (CCF) is responsible for ensuring that personal data is processed in compliance with INTERPOL’s Constitution.[22] According to Art. 2 (1) of INTERPOL’s Constitution, INTERPOL aims to ensure and promote the widest possible mutual assistance between all criminal police authorities within the limits of the laws existing in the different countries and in the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. These jurisdictions partially also recognize Art. 54 of the Schengen Convention, Art. 21 TFEU and Art. 50 CFR. Thus, an examination of the Red Notice under European law is required according to INTERPOL’s rules and regulations. A Red Notice usually contains some facts of the case and the alleged crime where the cross-border background may become apparent. In these cases, INTERPOL could contact the National Central Bureau to inquire whether the person concerned has already been convicted of the same offense in the relevant Contracting or Member State.

The ECJ has confirmed the prohibition of double jeopardy as a foundational pillar of the European Rule of Law. Therefore, it is unacceptable that an international police authority without supervision under international law,[23] as a “self-binding organisation”[24] and consequently with the legal status of a non-state international association, should ignore fundamental rights in the European Union and the Contracting States of the Schengen Agreement if there are indications of a violation of these rights. The right to implement an arrest request in more than 190 Member States of INTERPOL must be followed by an obligation to verify compliance with EU and Schengen Law.

Besides, it remains with the Contracting and Member States to ensure compliance with procedural rights under EU and Schengen Law. For this reason, it would also be possible that INTERPOL’s National Central Bureaus examine themselves whether a final judicial decision has been made in this matter against the relevant person when a Red Notice is received. In this case, this information must be shared and implemented in all “channels” at least through an addendum in accordance with Directive 2016/680. Subsequently, the person concerned would have to be informed in order to have the possibility to obtain a judicial decision confirming the application of ne bis in idem to this case.

IV. Final remarks

The ECJ’s decision of May 12, 2021, points in the right direction. Arrests based on a Red Notice are also subject to the law of Member States and Contracting States. The prohibition of double jeopardy and a corresponding legal certainty for persons concerned ultimately depend on the information available to the Contracting and Member States. If the application of ne bis in idem is uncertain, an arrest based on a Red Notice is not precluded by the ECJ. But once a final judicial decision has established ne bis in idem, any arrests based on the same offence and facts are precluded in Contracting and Member States. The ECJ requires from the Member States and Contracting States that they create corresponding legal remedies.

The relevant scenarios described above show that there is still insufficient legal certainty for the persons affected by a Red Notice. In particular, it is unclear whether all Contracting and Member States recognize the legal assessment of a court of another Contracting or Member State that determined the applicability of ne bis in idem. Moreover, it remains open whether and how information on the application of the prohibition of double jeopardy can be filed in all “channels” to avoid bureaucratic challenges.

From the perspective of the person concerned, the risk of double jeopardy continues to hang over the freedom of movement. Since in many cases an extradition could result in decades of imprisonment, especially in the US, it is advisable not to leave the home country until INTERPOL or the Contracting and Member States delete the arrest request in all “channels” or an addendum is implemented that reliably prevents an arrest.

[1] OLG Frankfurt am Main, StV 2020, 620 ff., m. Anm. Gazeas.

[2] VG Wiesbaden (6. Kammer), Beschluss vom 27. Juni 2019 – 6 K 565/17, BeckRS 2019, 12928.

[3] The ECJ examined questions 1 to 3 together, see ECJ, judg. of May 12, 2021, C-505/19, para. 67.

[4] In the following a reference to the paragraphs (para) of ECJ, judg. of May 12, 2021, C-505/19.

[5] With reference to ECJ, judg. of February 11, 2003, “Gözütok”/“Brügge”, C-187/01 and C-385/01, paras. 22, 27 and 48; ECJ, judg. of March 10, 2005, “Miraglia”, C-469/03, paras. 34, 35; siehe grundlegend Reichling, Europäische Dimensionen des „ne bis in idem“-Grundsatzes –Auslegungsprobleme des Art. 54 des Schengener Durchführungsübereinkommens, StudZR 2006, 447, 454 ff.

[6] Generalanwalt beim EuGH (Bobek), Schlussantrag vom 19. November 2020 – C-505/19, BeckRS 2020, 31321, Rn. 60-64.

[7] Unter Verweis auf u. a. „Petruhhin“, EuGH NJW 2017, 378 ff.

[8] According to the ECJ it should be noted that the request for a preliminary ruling concerned only a provisional arrest of a person and not the extradition oft hat person to a third country.

[9] According to English translation, para 98.

[10] View Meyer/Hüttemann, Internationale Fahndung nach Personen – von Steckbriefen, Rotecken und Funksprüchen, ZStW 128 (2016), 394, 431 f.; Grützner/Pötz/Kreß/Gazeas/Schamberg, Internationaler Rechtshilfeverkehr in Strafsachen, 3. Aufl., 43. Lfg., Band 4, III B 1, Rn. 11 ff.; re. INTERPOL as „Transgovernmental Organization“, Runjiv, The Legal Nature and Status of Interpol in the Context of Contemporary International Law (2017), S. 170 ff., https://ssrn.com/abstract=3166171.

[11] Generalanwalt beim EuGH (Bobek), Schlussantrag vom 19. November 2020 – C-505/19, BeckRS 2020, 31321, Rn. 120.

[12] Generalanwalt beim EuGH (Bobek), Schlussantrag vom 19. November 2020 – C-505/19, BeckRS 2020, 31321, Rn. 121.

[13] The wording of the addendum to the Red Notice was as follows: „[The National Central Bureau of] Wiesbaden considers that double jeopardy should apply as the charges, on which the red notice are based, are identical to an offence for which Munich’s public prosecutor’s office took proceedings against the subject, which were terminated,“ siehe (Bobek), Schlussantrag vom 19. November 2020 – C-505/19 (englische Fassung), BeckRS 2020, 31321, Rn. 89.

[14] Grützner/Pötz/Kreß/Gazeas/Schamberg, Internationaler Rechtshilfeverkehr in Strafsachen, 3. Aufl., 43. Lfg., Band 4, III B 1, Rn. 63 ff.

[15] Grützner/Pötz/Kreß/Gazeas/Schamberg, Internationaler Rechtshilfeverkehr in Strafsachen, 3. Aufl., 43. Lfg., Band 4, III B 1, Rn. 63 ff., 108 ff.

[16] View Rosenthal/Schramm, Interpol – Instrumentalisierung durch Despoten und rechtliche Verteidigungsmöglichkeiten Betroffener, StraFo 2015, 450, 455 ff.; Grützner/Pötz/Kreß/Gazeas/Schamberg, Internationaler Rechtshilfeverkehr in Strafsachen, 3. Aufl., 43. Lfg., Band 4, III B 1, Rn. 113 ff.

[17] View Meyer/Hüttemann, Internationale Fahndung nach Personen – von Steckbriefen, Rotecken und Funksprüchen, ZStW 128 (2016), 394, 431 f.; Grützner/Pötz/Kreß/Gazeas/Schamberg, Internationaler Rechtshilfeverkehr in Strafsachen, 3. Aufl., 43. Lfg., Band 4, III B 1, Rn. 11 ff.; re. INTERPOL als „Transgovernmental Organization“, Runjiv, The Legal Nature and Status of Interpol in the Context of Contemporary International Law (2017), S. 170 ff., https://ssrn.com/abstract=3166171.

[18] In this context, a request for deletion of the Red Notice in the EU and Schengen area is already pending at the CCF.

[19] Siehe zur Zuständigkeit des US-amerikanischen DoJ Litzka, Individualverteidigung bei DOJ/SEC-Ermittlungen aus deutscher Sicht, WiJ 2012, 79, 80.

[20] Generalanwalt beim EuGH (Bobek), Schlussantrag vom 19. November 2020 – C-505/19, BeckRS 2020, 31321 Rn. 120.

[21] Statute of the Commission for the Control of INTERPOL’s Files.

[22] Constitution of the International Criminal Police Organization Interpol.

[23] Siehe hierzu Grützner/Pötz/Kreß/Gazeas/Schamberg, Internationaler Rechtshilfeverkehr in Strafsachen, 3. Aufl., 43. Lfg., Band 4, III B 1, Rn. 113, 140.

[24] Meyer/Hüttemann Internationale Fahndung nach Personen – von Steckbriefen, Rotecken und Funksprüchen, ZStW 128 (2016), 394, 430.